[Promotum] Afghan/OBL errata

[Edmund A. Hintz]

Thanks to all who contributed to this one...

First, the humor:

For the ladies, here's something you can do to help weed out the 
terrorists(Dirty Ol' Uncle Sam wants YOU!) :

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Do your part:

The President has asked that we unite for a common cause. As the
hardline Islamic fundamentalists can not stand nudity, and consider
it a sin to see a naked woman that is not their wife, tomorrow at
noon, all women should run out of their homes and offices naked to
help weed out the terrorists.

The United States appreciates your efforts, and applauds you.

God Bless America!

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Next, a couple of amusing morphs of OBL with Rowan Atkinson:

http://www.hintz.org/media/OsamaBeanLaden.jpg
http://www.hintz.org/media/BeanLaden.jpg

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Finally, an extremely long essay on the Afgan situation by a West Point 
grad who spent many years in Afghanistan with the UN. While I admit to 
having some reservations with funding and supporting the Northern 
Alliance (that sort of thinking is what got us into this mess to begin 
with), his humanitarian points are spot on, whether you're a peacenik or 
military fan. Reservations aside, I'm not sure I see a better answer, 
perhaps the humanitarian aid would keep the Northern Alliance folks from 
turning into the terrorists of 10-20 years from now.


 Dear Classmates:

 Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American 
citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first 
there in 1993 providing relief and assistance to refugees along the Tajik 
border and in this capacity have traveled all along the border region 
between the two countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was the Deputy Program 
Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is 
the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000 persons 
clearing mines and UXO. In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically 
engaged in a "Holy War" as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of 
landmines, and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who 
might have died in this effort were considered to "martyrs" even an 
"infidel" like myself.  The mine action program is the most respected 
relief effort in the country and because of this I had the opportunity to 
travel extensively, without too much interference or restriction. I still 
have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community and 
read a great deal on the subject.

 I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but 
quite frankly I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have 
not had time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to 
use them as a basis for sharing some observations.

 First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and 
character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some 
comments about our "enemy."

 Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated 
beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people live 
day-to-day, hand to mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery and 
deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less. 
The country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace. 
They know very little of the world at large, and have no access to 
information or knowledge that would counter what they are being told by 
the Taliban. They have nothing left, nothing that is except for their 
pride.

 Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often 
referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious 
leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan contingent 
came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war against the 
Russians. Many came using a covert network created with assistance by our 
own government. OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the 
country at the time) restored this network to bring in more fighters, 
this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against the former 
Mujehdeen. Over time this military support along with financial support 
has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government 
activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector general" of Taliban armed 
forces, his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders and he has built a 
system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand 
cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?). His forces 
basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.

 This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 
years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part 
of the local Afghans. At the same time the legitimacy of the Taliban 
regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local 
humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have 
become even harsher. It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer 
support the Taliban.  Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very 
difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely 
more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or 
from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action were probably on 
their way to sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside 
doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan-defeat and dismemberment.

 During the Afghan war with the Soviets much attention was paid to the 
martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time and 
most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all 
want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against 
the Soviets. Those concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while 
never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good" 
Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light. Basic military 
skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that no matter 
what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed, firing from the 
prone is considered distasteful (but still done). Traditionally, the 
Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters owing 
allegiance to a "commander" and this person owing allegiance upwards and 
so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while 
the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of the units in the 
Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be there. All such 
groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines. Again, 
the concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount 
importance and blood feuds between families and tribes can last for 
generations over a perceived or actual slight.  That is one reason why 
there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the Russians. It is a very 
difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of Afghans into a 
military formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the war 
against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our 
fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of Stingers came in and 
were given to one Mujehdeen group, another group-supposedly on the same 
side, attacked the first group and stole the Stingers, not so much 
because they wanted to use them, but because having them was a matter of 
prestige. Many larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct 
failed when all the various Afghan fighting groups would give up their 
assigned tasks (such as blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the 
assault group in order to seek glory. In comparison to Vietnam, the 
intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities were lower for all 
involved.

 As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not 
THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less 
so than the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered? It 
goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will. During their history the only 
events that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the 
Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this the 
Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is 
the ability to endure hardships that would, in all probability, kill most 
Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military 
units. The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, 
the weather and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use 
to their advantage and use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types 
and armchair generals--around November 1st most road movement is 
impossible, in part because all the roads used by the Russians have been 
destroyed and air movement will be problematic at best).

 Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others do not 
think the US has the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed after the 
absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was 
that we were cowards, who would not risk one life in face to face combat. 
Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that 
action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the 
perception that the US does not have any "will" and that were are morally 
and spiritually corrupt.

 Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their 
propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the 
extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to 
fight coordinated battles and their lack of external support. More 
importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their 
strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by 
increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down 
trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up 
and down mountain valleys.

 I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and 
well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second 
guess current plans or start an academic debate I would share the 
following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans. First, I 
would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy 
off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this 
cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership making 
it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing 
discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with military 
assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine 
its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans. Fourth would be to give 
massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in 
Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a 
reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation or 
dying fighting the "infidel." Fifth, start a series of public works 
projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these are 
much more than the press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that 
improvements come with peace. Sixth, I would consider vary carefully 
putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper-sorry to the 
females of our class but within that culture a man who allows a women to 
fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the 
cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights 
with women. I would hold off from doing anything to dramatic in the new 
term, keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the 
winter, allowing this pressure to force open the fissions around the 
Taliban that were already developing. I expect that they will quickly 
turn on themselves and on OBL. We can pick up the pieces next summer, or 
the summer after. When we do "pick-up" the pieces I would make sure that 
we do so on the ground, "man to man." While I would never want to 
advocate American causalities, it is essential that we communicate to OBL 
and all others watching that we can and will "engage and destroy the 
enemy in close combat." As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or 
hold terrain, but Infantry operations against the enemy are essential. 
There can be no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds 
of our enemies regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will 
communicate this except for ground combat. And once this is all over, 
unlike in 1989 the US must provide continued long-term economic 
assistance to rebuild the country.

 While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to 
share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not 
abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there 
is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner 
exchange.

During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist 
prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in 
prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home 
with them.  This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and 
Chechnya were similar videos are being made today and can be found on the 
web for those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the 
same way. Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US 
prisoners having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not only 
to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us 
to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian populations and 
to turn this into the world wide religious war that they desperately 
want.  This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further 
collaboration of this type of activity please read Kipling).

 This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and 
somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our 
enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of 
our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our 
enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during 
war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there 
are many, but for shrewd military logic.

 For anyone who is still reading this way to long note, thanks for your 
patience. I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more 
concise manner.

 Thanks, Richard Kidd(USMA '86)



Peace,

Edmund A. Hintz              **|**     "You may say I'm a dreamer,
Mac Techie, Unix Geek,      *  |  *      But I'm not the only one...
Mac/Unix Consultant        *  /|\  *     I hope someday you'll join us,
<ed@hintz.org>              */ | \*      And the world will live as one.
'78 Westy                    *****      Imagine."
                     http://www.hintz.org